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The revolution of North Yemen to step down the Imam Traditional Regime in 1962, and the 
independent of South Yemen from the British colony in 1967, both never produced 
systematic process for democracy building in their societies. The declaration of two parts 
Unification in 1990 represented a new shifting in the evolution of contemporary Yemen at the 
level of democracy building process. The newly established country adopted democracy and 
political pluralism, a formula that was widely adopted in many developing countries with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The constitution of The Republic of Yemen, which was 
amended in 1994 stated that political pluralism and multi – parties system is an essential 
element in the political regime. Within two decades (1990 – 2010) Yemen has witnessed 
many activities and programs that were considered to be steps in the process of democracy 
building. The elections at the parliamentary, presidential, and local levels were the explicit 
expression of such activities and programs. Within the events of the political crisis, that 
started to appear in 2006, and the failure of dialogue between the regime and the political 
opposition in 2010, and blow of Arab Spring winds to Yemen in the beginning of 2011, it 
appears clearly that democracy building strongly faced serious challenges and closing doors. 
Although the Gulf Cooperation Council's Initiative in Nov. 2011 gave some hopes to find 
some outlets, and suggested what we call the transition period of two years in order to reach a 
presidential and parliamentary elections, the invasion of the Yemeni Capital in Sep. 2014 by 
Houthis militias, the cover allied between former president Salah and the Houthis militias, 
and the outbreak of armed extension by this militias to control the other governorates all over 
the country, and hence the announcement of Zero Time to launch the Decisive Storm by the 
allied forces leaded by Saudi Arabia in March, 2015 to bring back the legitimate president 
Hadi to power, all these events stopped the process of democracy building and pushed this 
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process to the Grand Failure Station. Within this 25 – year duration, we witnessed a very 
influential role of the external factors, the role exerted by the international actors such as the 
USA, the EU, and the UN. This paper address such influence, and focuses on the roles of the 
external actors at two levels: the first is the regional and superpowers, the second is the 
regional and international organizations. 
This Grand Failure was practically the result of interaction between internal and external 
factors.  As a main objective the paper will focus only on the external factors for the decisive 
role it played. Hence then this paper aims to investigate the role of the factors that are 
included in the external environment, and discuss the impact of such factors on enhancing or 
undermining the process of democracy building in Yemen. 
To some extent the System – Approach provide us with a reasonable methodological 
framework to analyze the variables of external environment via the Inputs – Outputs 
interaction included in Easton's model as shown in the diagram. The external environment 
has a strong impact on the two – element equation of Inputs (demands and support). To some 
extent, the patterns of demands and support provided by the external environment strongly 
determine the patterns of response of the political system in the process of democracy 








The paper will try to examine a very simple hypothesis states that: “ external powers tend to 
support  security as high priority rather than democracy”. 
 
To fulfill the objective of the paper, and to examine the mentioned hypothesis, the paper will 
include four chapters, the first one will briefly discuss the impact of regional environment. 
The second one will focus on the international environment. The third one will be dedicated 
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for the collective efforts of the regional and international actors. The last one will emphasize 
on the deterioration of democracy building in Yemen within the events of the Arab Spring 
and the recent circumstances.   
 
The First Chapter:Regional Environment and the Patterns  of Demands and Support  
 
Noninvolvement of the GCC Countries in the Process of Democracy Building 
 
The main characteristic of the neighboring states which are members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) is noninvolvement in such process. Democracy building 
required many elements such as pluralism and competitive – parties system, routine 
elections at different levels, free media, enhancing political and civil human rights etc., 
which to some extent contradict the stable political traditions of the GCC members’ political 
regimes. It seems from the first moment that the two sides, Yemen and the GCC countries, 
have a different perception of the nature of political participation, mechanisms of creating 
political elites, and methods of assuming leadership positions. There is no doubt that 
political concerns about the regional implications of the political reform project explain 
much of the reluctance, lack of enthusiasm, and rejection of the items of this project. 
However, reference is made in some cases to the democratic experiment in Yemen in the 
context of the accession of Yemen to the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the suggestion by 
some that the multi-party and democratic experience in Yemen may be one of the real 
dilemmas which prevents its accession to the Council. This emphasizes the concern felt by 
the GCC countries regarding the evolution of the democratic experience in Yemen, 




However Saudi Arabia, faced another challenge in dealing with democracy building in 
Yemen. This challenge stems from political instability and security, experienced by Yemen 
with the growing sources of threat coming from the Houthi movement in Saada, the Iranian 
interest in establishing ideological relations with the Houthi movement, and al-Qaeda, along 
                                                          
1
 Of course there are some exceptions in this context, for example, the praise that was stated by one of the members of the Saudi 
Shura Council in Sana'a during his participation in the Association of Senates meetings and Equivalent Councils in Africa and the 
Arab world, when he said, "Yemen has made great strides and has taken advanced steps in this area.” He added that “the Saudi, 
government and people look at the steps of democracy in Yemen with great admiration and recognition,” and that “this 
experience is the honor and pride of all Arabs. The political will in Yemen is present and that is the basis to achieve a democratic 
pluralistic political system”.  See statement by the Saudi Shura Council member Abdul-Rahman bin Abdul Aziz Sweilem in "26 
September" on November 13th, 2005. www.26sep.net/news_details.php?lng=english&sid=10521 
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with the continued deterioration of economic conditions. Building democracy in Yemen will 
create more space for such extremist groups, and give them an extended role in policy 
decision making, which will add a source of threat to Saudi and other Gulf countries security. 
The Saudi insistence increased to exercise a greater role with the growing Houthi threat. The 
desire of the GCC countries to avoid sources of threat forces them to support Yemen in the 
context of an integrated comprehensive reforms system, which includes the necessity to fight 
corruption and support good governance, as well as dialogue between the government and the 
opposition and the political reform process in general within London Conference in Nov. 
2006, and the different efforts that followed. 
 
It must be recognized that the role of the Gulf in general and Saudi Arabia in particular in the 
design of political reform trends in Yemen in the midst of the momentous events witnessed 
by Yemen in 2011 was essential. The GCC provided its known initiative that meant to 
present solutions to the risk of systemic collapse. 
 
From such brief discussion, we can easily conclude that the GCC countries never performed 
any kind of pressure, never submit any demands to build democracy in Yemen, and never 
provide that tangible support for such process. 
 
 
Iran: Destructive Support in Democracy Building Process 
 
The unification of Yemen in 1990 formed a significant leap in the Yemeni way of thinking as 
unity was associated with political pluralism and democratic transformation. This provided a 
fertile ground for the emergence of a lot of organizations, parties, and political movements 
that represented all political, intellectual and religious directions. In this context, a new 
movement which was called in the beginning the “Muslim Youth Forum” was the main core 
for founding the Believing Youth organization, led by Hussein Badr al-Deen al-Houthi. The 
organization’s strength grew along with its ability to attract hundreds of young people who 
have undergone cultural, political, and ideological awareness training based upon the impact 
of the Iranian theoretical approaches to the concept of Imamate with its Twelver-Jaafari 
context. Iranian diplomatic missions were successful, through cultural delegations, in 
attracting some Yemeni students and providing them with scholarships outside of the formal 
cultural exchange programs between the two countries, or the nomination of Yemeni students 
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for cultural exchange programs grants depending on the nomination of some religious sheikhs 
without referring back to the government agencies.  
 
In addition, the organization began to give a slogan to its ideological orientations, the 
vocabulary of which was inspired by the Iranian revolution 
2
, and its view of Iranian-
American relations, which portrays the United States as the great Satan, and Israel as the 
regional arch enemy. This paved the way for the emergence of the Houthi movement slogan: 
"God is great. Death to America. Death to Israel. Damned be the Jews. Victory to Islam”.3 At 
the same time, this carried an important addition to the name of the movement, as the Houthis 
movement became known also as the “slogan/scream” group. 
 
Thus, we find that the regional environment and the nature of good relations between Yemen 
and Iran had formed a favorable environment for the growth of Iranian-backed thought-
currents, combining the traditional heritage of the “Zaidi” with the attempt to inspire the 
style, principles, and values of the Iranian experience at the forefront of the Young Believers 
organization. At a later stage, the organization adopted armed confrontation, with alleged 
Iranian support. The most dangerous aspect in this context is that the armed confrontation, 
which took place in six wars that erupted between 2004 and the beginning of 2010. The 
fighting made Yemen an arena for settling regional scores between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
The Kingdom  entered as a main party in the sixth war after the Houthi movement expanded 
the scope of the war to take a regional dimension beyond the Yemeni border.  
 
With the exception of the active Iranian role, first in supporting the Houthis movement 
through political reform and secondly through armed conflict, Iran remained far from the rest 
of democracy building process in Yemen. 
 
However, the winds of the Arab Spring which blew over Yemen in early 2011 may have 
created a fertile environment to broaden the Iranian role in supporting the Houthis, either 
through direct contribution to the revolutionary efforts, or through the horizontal and vertical 
Houthist expansion. This expansion happened through strengthening the role of the 
movement in Saada by almost totally controlling the governorate after the expulsion of the 
                                                          
2
  See: Nevine Abdel Moneim Massad (1999), Islamic Republic of Iran and the Challenge of Cultural Globalization, p 15, The 
Arab Future, Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies. (Arabic). 
3 The Yemeni Strategic Studies Center (2008). The Yemeni Strategic Report 2007, p 167, Sana'a (Arabic). 
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governor and the inauguration of a new governor with the support of the Houthist movement, 
as well as the proliferation and infiltration of the revolutionary squares that extended in 
several provinces of the Republic. But the most remarkable Iranian support coincide the 
expansion of the Houthis movement to take over Amran governorate in August 2014, 
invasion of the capital of the country in Sep. 2014, and the invasion of the other governorates 
in the north and south of the country.  
 
In general the Iranian demands and pressure was exerted to enable the Houthis movement to 
be a core player within the democracy building process in Yemen, weather its support 
focused on the armed expansion of the Houthis movement in the country which resulted in a 
disastrous impact in such process.   
 
 
The Second Chapter: International Environment and the Patterns of Demands and 
Support 
 
Within the international environment we can identify some key players, Particularly the USA, 
who has a huge involvement in democracy building process in Yemen. 
1 - USA: Demands and Support Strongly Connected with List of Priorities which 
sometimes contradict Democratization 
 
A. Democracy as Priority: Strong Demands and Reasonable Support 
The announcement to build democracy in Yemen coincide the declaration of 
unification in 1990. The founders of the Republic of Yemen (RoY) stressed the link 
between Yemeni unity and democratization, emphasized the centrality of democratic 
values within the political system, and adopted reasonable steps towards democracy 
building including multi-party system, legislative reform
4
, and enhancing freedoms.  
                                                          
4
  The Law of the Press and Publications was considered the first formal recognition of legal party pluralism, as it asserted 
the right of political parties in the ownership and issuance of newspapers and magazines. This was followed by the 
issuance of the political parties and organizations law in 1991, which came to clarify the ambiguity of Article 39 in the text 
of the 1990 Constitution. It stated that political and party pluralism based on the constitutional legitimacy is a right and a 
cornerstone of the political and social system. The law also established a committee for the parties and political 
organizations affairs and formed The Supreme Elections Commission to manage and supervise the elections. For details 
See: The Presidency Council (1990), Law No. 25 of 1990 on the Press and Publications, Sana'a, Dec 23, Article 33. Also See: 
The Presidency Council (1991), Law No. (66) for the year 1991 on political and organizational parties, Sana'a, 16 October, 
The Press Service of Printing and Publishing, Article 3 Also See:  The Presidency Council (1992), Law No. (41) for the year 
1992 on the general election, Sana'a, June, Articles 3.20 (Arabic). 
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In this context, the United States supported the Yemeni unity  on the condition that 
the new state will adopted and democracy and a multiparty system. In the same the 
United States believed that Yemen's unity would strengthen security and stability in a 
region that is rich in oil and of vital importance to U.S. interests. 
 
However, the early support provided by Bush administration for democracy building 
soon collided with Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. It was clear at this point 
that American support depended on required political positions from Yemen. 
According to Arthur Hughes, the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen at the time, : "The 
development of Yemen's relations with its neighbors in the Gulf is more important to 
the USA than pluralism and civil liberties. Following Yemen’s vote against UN 
Security Council Resolution 678 in Nov. 1990 (which authorized a military attack on 
Iraq), the all U.S. aid to Yemeni Democracy was stopped. 
 
Yemen witnessed the first parliamentary elections on 27 April 1993. The result paved 
the way for forming a second coalition government that included the GPC, Islah and 
the YSP 
5
. Yemen’s steps within the democratization project led the U.S. 
administration to review its policies towards Yemen and described the result of 
election as free and fair overall. However, the United States was cautious, and the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs at the time David Mack 
said, "One election does not make a democracy". He went on to demand further 
reforms and to suggest that Yemen maybe a suitable model for neighboring countries. 
His comments were a clear reference to Saudi Arabia and GCC countries. 
 
The remarkable support was in summer 1994, when the leaders of the Socialist Party 
(YSP) declared the secession. The USA did not support secession as Washington 
believed that security and stability in the entire region were linked to the existence of 
a unified, democratic Yemen. On the other hand, the democratization process 
remained questioned. In 1994, the United States pictured regime becoming a 
nightmare that should be treated with caution, noting that President Saleh "has come 
out of civil war, with capabilities of strength and monopoly of power, and that he has 
                                                          
5
 Galal Ibrahim Fakirah (2005), Political and democratic reforms in Yemen during fifteen years, p 125, in the Yemen news 
agency Saba’, A symposium of fifteen years of political and economic reforms 24 to 25 April 2005, Sana'a, Center for Research and 
Information.  
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the wealth, potential and human resources to turn Yemen into another Iraq by turning 
the Gulf oil into a valuable hostage to ensure the imposition of a fait accompli in the 




However, Yemen was keen at this stage to find some kind of balance in international 
economic relations, granting the French company “Total” the rights of investment in 




The American reaction to the Yemeni political and oil policies was negative 
represented by the U.S. report on Human Rights in Yemen in 1995, which confirmed 
the Yemeni authorities’ violations of human rights, dignity, civil and political 
freedoms 
8
. Washington’s recourse to conduct joint military exercises with Eritrea in 
April 1996, after less than five months of the Eritrean occupation of the Yemeni 
island of Hanish, was a strong indicator of the U.S. dissatisfaction with the policies of 
Yemen. 
 
The United States adopted a new approach to deal with the parliamentary election in 
1997 based on direct dialogue with the opposition parties in order to formulate a 
common vision on the preparation for the elections. However, these parties were not 
satisfied with the level of U.S. support offered.  
 
The elections were held on schedule in April 1997. The General People's Congress 
(the president's party) garnered 187 seats of 301. This result paved the way for the end 
of the coalition government’s era, as the GPC now had enough seats to govern 
independently. 
 
                                                          
6
 Mohammed Amin al-Masri (1996), Yemen .. The next goal of U.S. pressure, Al-Ahram, Cairo, p 40,136, 26/10/1996. (Arabic). 
7
 The volume of French troops in Djibouti is about 4000 individuals including combat units of the Marines, an armored 
reconnaissance unit, an artillery unit, amphibious landing crafts and a variety of light aircraft. See Talaat Ahmed Muslim (1994), 
The Foreign Military Presence in the Arab World, pp 135-152, Beirut, Centre for Arab Unity Studies. April. (Arabic). 
 
8
 U.S. Department of State (1996), Annual Report to the U.S. State Department on human rights situation in Yemen, 1995, pp 1-22, 
Washington. The previous or subsequent reports on the human rights situation in Yemen were not better than the 1995 report. 
See the contents of the U.S. approach about the situation of human rights in Yemen 
U. S. Department of State, (1997), Yemen Country Report on Human Rights for 1996, pp. 1-12. Washington, DC, The Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January 30. See also Human Rights Watch (1994), Middle East, Yemen, pp.7-30, 
Washington, DC, Vol. 6, No. 1. 
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Although the election results indicated the presence of a large imbalance between the 
political forces involved, Washington praised the development of the reform process, 
describing it as an important step towards expanding political participation and 
democracy building. This official position, based on the U.S. Embassy assessment in 
Sana’a, which was in line with reports in the American press, and with the U.S. 
National Democratic Institute report, which participated in monitoring the elections.   
 
The presidential elections of September 1999 were the first real test for the credibility 
in the USA Administration. The election was an unequal race between the candidates. 




The United States at this stage was more involved in the democratization process and 
more critical of it at the same time in terms of form and the technical procedures 
which accompanied the presidential election. Although the U.S. emphasized that the 
elections were free and fair in general, it presented a number of criticisms:  
 
 The main opposition party, Islah, did not run a candidate and instead supported 
and assisted the GPC candidate (the party of the president). 
 The voters’ registry was flawed.. 
 Najib Qahtan al-Shaabi, the only competitor, also belonged to the GPC, the party 
of the incumbent president. 
  The GPC candidate, Ali Abdullah Saleh, did not face a real competition10.  
 
 
B. Security in Place of Democracy:  
Huge Support for Anti-Terror File 
 
Following the Palestinian uprising in October 2000 and the attack on USS Cole U.S. 
priorities changed in Yemen. Security concerns and counter-terrorism became the top 
priority and trumped concern for the democratic experiment
11
.  As a consequence, at 
                                                          
9
 See: Abdullah Ahmed Saleh al-Hassani (2006), Democratization and Political stability in Yemen from 1990 to 2003, p 111, Cairo, 
Unpublished MA Thesis submitted to the Arab Research and Studies Institute. 
10
 U.S. Department of State, Yemen's Human Rights Report 1999, Washington D.C, 2000, P. 
11
 For more details on this subject, see: Bakeel A. Al-Zandani, (2003), US-Yemeni Relations in a Changing World: A study of Four 
Major events in US-Yemeni relations, pp. 67-69, unpublished MA thesis submitted to the Long Island University, April. 
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least from the American pint of view, the local council elections of 2001, as well as 
the referendum on constitutional amendments in February 2001 passed unnoticed 
despite their importance to democracy building in Yemen. The constitutional 
amendments included an extension of the presidential term from five to seven years. 
At the same time, the term for members of the House of Representatives was extended 
from four to six years
12
. The U.S. also paid little attention to the debate between the 
ruling party and the opposition over amendments to the elections law. The opposition 
called for the use of proportional representation lists; a run-off system in 
constituencies where no candidate obtains an absolute majority in the first session; 
emphasis on equal representation of active parties in the Supreme Committee for 
Elections and Referendum (SCER, a body tasked with overseeing elections and 
referendum), as well as in supervisory and indigenous committees; financial 
independence of the SCER; modifying the electoral districts so that they are limited to 
family and ordinary residence locations using only voter ID and not any other form of 
ID to allow voters to vote as an anti-fraud measures; re-dividing constituencies in 




After the election and referendum of 2001, Washington sent the American 
counterterrorism coordinator Edmund Hull to visit Sana'a in March 2001, and soon 
was appointed as an ambassador to Yemen in September 2001. The importance of the 
security portfolio for Yemeni-American relations grew, especially after the events of 
September 11, 2001.  Many Yemenis were wary of the possibility of an American 
attack after the US State Department announced a number of targets including two in 
Yemen that include Aliman University which belongs to the religious Shekh 
Abdualmjed Alzndani. However, Yemeni cooperation with US counterterrorism 
efforts led the U.S. ambassador in Sana’a, Mr. Eudmond Huol, to say, "In the war 
against terrorism, Yemen is a partner and not a target". The  former Commander in 
Chief of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), General Zinni, also said that 
Yemen is not a target of any U.S. military attack . 
                                                          
12
 The Republic of Yemen (2001), The Permanent Constitution, Articles 65,112. 
 
13
 See: Galal Ibrahim Fakirah (2002), Yemen from 2001 to 2002, pp 203-205, Dar al Khaleej Press, Printing and Publishing, The 
Gulf Strategic Report 2001-2002, Sharjah. 
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The security concerns remained dominant in U.S.-Yemeni relations. The visit by 
former Vice President Dick Cheney to Sana'a in 2002 seemed to confirm the priority 
of security concerns as security cooperation, training courses, military aid and joint 
planning were the main topic of discussion by contrast, supporting the political reform 




The general direction of U.S. policy towards Yemen continued to focus on the 
security, excluding political reform and democracy building, even in April 2003 when 
the parliamentary elections which were held 
15
. The USA limited its actions to 
describing the elections through the U.S. State Department report on democracy and 
human rights. The report highlighted a number of positive developments including:   
 The ability of the opposition to establish a strong alliance through the Joint 
Meeting Parties (JMP). 
 The JMP’s program of political reform which called for democracy and gives 
priority to progressive political reform,  human rights, governance reform, 
fighting corruption, and social service reform. 
 The JMP’s agreement to a joint list of candidates which included 172 
parliamentary candidates for the 301 constituencies. 
 The ability of the JMP to win 56 seats in the elected parliament,  versus 229 seats 




With the exception of this report, the US did not issue any statements or official 
position regarding the 2003 elections. Neither did it provide any serious support for 
the elections. The lack of assistant could have been related to the debate on the 
partnership of the Greater Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), announced by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, which linked security and politics, and the 
inevitability of the political reforms process in the region. Yemen may have been 
clear in dealing with this initiative, as Yemeni officials said that the political reform 
                                                          
14
 Abdualghni alshameri (2008), O.P.Cit., p. 112. 
15
 The GPC received 226 seats, Islah 46 seats, the Yemeni Socialist Party 7 seats, the Unionist Nasserust Organization 3 seats, 
the Arab Socialist Baath Party two seats. See: Galal Fakira, Political reforms and democracy, within fifteen years, p 132, a previously 
mentioned source. 
16
 U.S. Department of State (2004), Report of the U.S. State Department on human rights situation in Yemen in 2003, Washington, Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 26. 
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process was an internal affair that would respond to the trajectory of social evolution 
and its real needs.  
 
Thomas Krajeski succeeded Edmund Hull as an Ambassador to Sana'a in August 
2004. Krajeski presented the American vision of a link between politics and security 
which indicates that Yemen is a weak state suffers from unemployment, poverty, 
deterioration of standards of living, absence of the rule of law, and corruption. It faces 
many economic, security, and social challenges, and as such democracy and political 
reform can be an entry to chaos. Therefore, democracy would take a back seat while 
security issues are prioritized, based on the hypothesis that "there can be no 
democracy without security and no security without democracy “ 
17
. This vision is 
directly linked to the importance of Yemen and its geographical location in the 
strategic thinking of the U.S., as being an important step in the cycle of war on terror. 
 
Despite the American praise for the political reform project including statements 
asserting that  democracy in Yemen should not be feared because was considered 
developed by the President and the Yemeni society without it being demanded by 
others, and that there were achievements especially in the nineties, and despite 
emphasizing that Yemen then offered a good foundation for a modern democratic 
society, and that democracy is always dynamic and mobile and no free democratic 
society can reach the stage of perfection, as stated by the American Ambassador 
Krajeski who was associated the supremacy of security concerns which was critical in 
determining the general course of the relations between the two countries. Soon 
enough, Krajeski’s speech changed fundamentally, On October 7th, 2005, he said in 





Krajeski’s statement resulted in much controversy in Yemen. One Yemeni official 
said that he was surprised by the statement, stressing that democracy in Yemen was a 
matter for the people of Yemen and not others. Another official said, "Yemen will not 
become like Abu Ghraib," as the official Al-Thawra newspaper launched an attack on 
Krajeski in an article entitled "Do not accept custody". This article stated, "the 
                                                          
17
 Abdualghni Alshameri (2008), O.P.Cit., P.106. 
18
 Abdualghni Alshameri (2008), O.P.Cit., P. 113. 
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democratic experience of Yemen is targeted by the Americans, despite the 
development and stability it is witnessing...". The U.S. Embassy in Sana’a tried to 
rectify the situation as the Deputy Chief of Mission stated that the media hype that 
had been raised was a result of mistranslation and that the relationship between the 
two friendly countries could not be affected by this error. He further asserted that 
democracy in Yemen was moving forward but slowly. 
 
In February 2006, 23 al-Qaeda detainees escaped from a prison in the capital. Those 
detainees had been accused of involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole and the 
French oil tanker Limburg. Thirteen of them were considered by the American 
administration to be senior members of al-Qaeda. Nine had been arrested by Saudi 
Arabia and handed over to Yemen in the framework of security cooperation between 
the two countries. 
 
This escape created resentment and distrust in the U.S. administration towards its 
Yemeni counterparts, , casting doubts over the Yemeni regime as an ally in the war on 
terrorism. The U.S. Presidential Advisor for Counterterrorism expressed 
disappointment, great concern, and frustration by the situation of the detainees, and 
said that the restrictions imposed on them were not tight
19
.  The escape also generated 
concern that the Yemeni government was attempting to distract the U.S with security 
issues, switching its focus from the political reform issue, especially since Yemen was 
on its way to conduct local and presidential elections 
 
In March 2006, the U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights report on Yemen for 
the year 2005 criticized the poor performance of the Yemeni government in some 
areas, such as restrictions on the ability of citizens to change the government, torture, 
deteriorating prison conditions, arbitrary arrests, long detention periods before starting 
trial proceedings, judiciary weakness,  constraints imposed on the freedom of the 
press and on assembly, intensified harassment against journalists, restrictions on 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of religion and personal 
freedoms, government corruption, lack of transparency, discrimination against 
                                                          
19
 Ibid, p. 116. 
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The importance of this report lies in it having been issued in the same year Yemen 
was preparing for presidential and local elections, which embarrassed the government 
and the ruling party. The Yemeni official response was represented by the Yemeni 
President’s visit to China in April 2006, where he stated that Yemen prefers to rely on 
Chinese aid and unconditioned loans, as opposed to the U.S. and European aid 
programs conditioned by political reform, democratic development, and human rights 
programs. The American response came through the US Deputy Chief of Mission in 
Sana'a, on two levels: First, He accused undefined sides of not wanting political 
reform in Yemen. Second, He questioned the Yemeni dependence on Chinese aid and 
loans in the long term, describing the amount of Chinese support as exaggerated. At t 
the same time he ruled out the existence of new policies in Yemen which adopt a path 




All these developments were just a few months before holding the presidential and 
local elections in Sep. 2006 when the US was just paying too much attention to 
security issues.  
 
In the context of preparing for the presidential and local elections, the dialogue 
between the government and the opposition on June 18
th
, 2006 culminated in the 
signature of a principle agreement intended to ensure the integrity of the presidential 
and local elections. The agreement contained twelve items of which the first eleven 
addressed the pre-election conditions. On the other hand, the 12th item addressed 




                                                          
20
 U.S. Department of State (2006), The State Department report on human rights in Yemen in 2005, Washington, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor. 
21
 Abd al-Ghani al-Shamiri, a previously mentioned source, p 117. 
22
 The first section of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum reads as follows: It was agreed to add two 
members of the Joint Meeting Parties to the current structure of the Supreme Commission, in order for the parliamentary blocs 
and organizations parties represented by the House of Representatives to present a proposal to amend the provisions of Article 
(19), paragraph (a) only of the Law No. (13) for the year 2001 on the elections and the referendum so that the amendment 
proposes expanding the formation of the Supreme Commission of seven to nine members from a list of the fifteen previously 
nominated by the House of Representatives. See: GPC and JMP, (2006), A principles agreement on ensuring conducting a free, fair, 
transparent and secure elections in the upcoming presidential and local elections, Sana'a, 18/6/2006. (Arabic). 
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The presidential and local elections were held in an atmosphere of intense competition 
between the GPC and the JMP. The GPC won the presidency with incumbent Ali 





The official American position was supportive of the election. President Bush 
congratulated the Yemeni President by telephone and praised the election’s freedom 
and fairness, as described by international observers, and assured him that the 
experiment represented a victory for Yemen and a model in the Middle East. Many 
U.S. officials emphasized that the Yemeni elections had met international standards 
regarding fairness and integrity, since the candidates were able to implement their 
election campaigns freely, and were given equal space in the official media for the 
implementation of their campaigns. In addition, international observers were 
welcomed and were able to travel within the country and observe freely. USA 
described it as the first competitive election in the Arabian Peninsula, which was 
considered to be an unprecedented development in the Middle East.  
 
The U.S. praise paralleled the praise of the European Commission, which participated 
in monitoring the elections and issued a set of recommendations on the election 
system reform and on the development of the democratic process, including reducing 
the use of public funds and on enhancing women's participation in the upcoming 
elections. These recommendations later became part of the main dialogue between the 
regime and the opposition in June 2007. 
 
In October 2007 the Yemeni authorities released one of al-Qaeda leaders who were 
accused of the first bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. The Americans reacted angrily. 
Justice Department spokesmen, said, "We are unhappy with and very worried about 
the Yemeni government's decision to release Jamal al-Badawi." He also stressed that 
the release al-Qaeda leader must be put behind bars and that America “will not 
tolerate and will not underestimate the issue of the USS Cole." In the same context, 
some called for cutting off aid to Yemen, as others like the former commander of USS 
Cole, Admiral Kirk Leopold who stressed that the Yemeni Government's’ action is a 
                                                          
23
 See the results of presidential and local elections in 2006 on the official site of the Supreme Commission for Elections and 
Referendum, www.scer.org.ye/arabic/elecpres06a.htm 
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clear proof that it is not trustworthy, and that Yemen cannot be considered a reliable 
partner in the war on terrorism 
24
. Perhaps the stronger reaction in this context was the 
decision of the Millennium Challenge Fund to postpone granting Yemen financial aid 
for an indefinite period. In the words of the Fund’s spokesman "that this step comes as 
a first punitive reaction to the Yemeni government because of the statement by a 
security agency source, published by the Yemeni news agency Saba’, in which it was 




The US administrations negative attitude was reinforced by a  number of events 
Yemen has witnessed after 2006 elections, including the opposition’s intention to 
boycott all procedures related to the formation of the election committee (SCER), the 
review of the voter registration record, the dispute regarding the formation of main 
and sub commissions to be formed in purpose of conducting the upcoming 
parliamentary elections approaching in April 2009, and the failure of dialogue 
between the government and the opposition, the depth of the political crisis became 
clear which raised concerns about the political situation among many international 
partners.  
 
The first manifestations of concern were represented in the postponement of local 
authority elections which was supposed to be held in 2008, and the extension of their 
duration through a House of Representatives decision in 2008. This extension was 
interpreted as an existence of a crisis in the political dialogue between the actors of 
the political process in Yemen. This failure spread to affect the parliamentary 
elections at a time where the National Democratic Alliance  parties, led by the GPC, 
continued to insist on holding the elections on time
26
. By contrast, the JMP confirmed 
that they would not participate in the upcoming elections.  
 
                                                          
24
 Abdalghni Alshameri, Op.Cit, p. 120.  
25
 Ibid, p. 120.  
26
 The National Democratic Alliance was established in July 2008 by the ruling party to confront the JMP. This alliance 
includes the Allied political opposition who are not represented in the parliament (called the National Council of 
Opposition). The  members include the Nasserite Democratic party, the Baathist National Party, the Yemeni Rabtah Party, 
the Social Green Party, the Democratic National Front, the Public Unity Party, the Democratic Septemberi Organization. For 
more details look at Dr. Galal Ibrahim Fakirah, (2009), Yemen 2008 – 2009, in the Gulf Strategic Report 2008 – 2009, 
Alsharekah, the Gulf Center for Studies, Dar Alkhaleej for Press and Publication, 1
st
 ed., pp. 157-158.  
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At this stage, the decisive foreign role emerged. The American National Democratic 
Institute’s (NDI) and the European Commission (EC) intervention in January and 
February 2009 found a political settlement both sides could agree on. The EC and the 
NDI put forward a number of technical factors for both sides to consider, and it was 
clear to followers that the European and American offer focused on the fact that 
democracy requires the participation of more than one actor and that the participation 
of EC and NDI in observation of the parliamentary elections requires the participation 
of both the government and the opposition in those elections,. However, the GPC 
realized at a later stage that the participation of the JMP in the elections had to be 
planned early, so it agreed to discuss the concepts raised by the EC and the NDI 
including: 
A. The postponement of the elections to complete the technical procedures, 
B. The agreement on the structure of the Supreme Commission for Elections and 
Referendum format  
C. The debate on a digital electoral register, 
D. The neutralization of public money and state resources in the elections, 
E. The regulations for the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum, 
F. The debate on the electoral system, to either use proportional representation lists 
or the first-past-the-post system, 
G. The allocation of quotas for women. 
 
In the last week of February 2009, the GPC, had no choice but to revise its decisions 
on moving forward with holding the elections on time, and a list that contains a series 
of concessions which should be provided in the face of the JMP appeared. Time was 
pressing strongly on the ruling party, especially with the looming constitutional due 
date, which stipulated inviting voters to participate in the parliamentary elections sixty 
days before the elections. The GPC had to announce a day before the due date that the 
parties had reached an agreement on the following points: 
 
A. Amendment of Article 65 of the Constitution regarding the House of 
Representatives terms of service to allow the extension of the current parliament 
for two years only. 
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B. Providing an opportunity for parties to discuss the constitutional amendments and 
laws necessary for the development of the political and electoral system, 
including proportional representation lists. 
C. Enabling the various parties in the House of Representatives to discuss the 
materials that have been agreed upon regarding the election law. 
D. The restructuring of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum as 
provided by law. 
 
With this agreement, which became known as the February Agreement, the 
parliamentary elections were postponed to April 2011. 
 
The US department of State expresses its disappointment for this postpone. Gordon 
Duguid, acting Deputy Department Spokesman, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of 
the Spokesman, released a press statement in March3, 2009, states that " The United 
States views with deep concern and disappointment the decision by Yemen’s ruling 
and opposition parties to postpone the April 2009 Parliamentary elections for two 
years. It is difficult to see how a delay of this duration serves the interests of the 
Yemeni people or the cause of Yemeni democracy. We sincerely hope that the 
political leadership of Yemen uses this period to cooperate in earnest to reach a 
consensus on the procedures for the elections that are consistent with the 
recommendations made by international elections observers in 2006. All parties share 
the responsibility to ensure that the people of Yemen have the opportunity to choose 
their representatives in a timely and transparent manner. The United States stands 
ready to assist in this process".  
 
 
The Third Chapter: Collective Efforts: From London to New York: Democracy 
Becomes an Essential part of the Security Structure  
 
Despite the growing security challenges faced by Yemen in recent years such as: the rising 
demand for secession on the South, the rise of youth movements, the growing al-Qaeda 
threat, especially after the unification of its branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia in early 
2009, and the outbreak of six wars with the Houthist Movement during the period between 
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2004 to 2010, the combination of these variables did not incite enough attention from the 
outside world including the United States and the European Union.  
 
However, the end of December 2009 brought attention to Yemen at a global level after the 
arrest of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian accused of attempting to blow up a 
U.S. airliner headed to Detroit. Immediately after that, the British government called for 
holding an international conference on Yemen, in an attempt at avoiding a crisis that could 
have regional implications
27
.  On the 27th of January 2010, the international conference  was 
held in London with British-American sponsorship in the presence of foreign ministers of 24 
countries such as the countries of the GCC, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Russia, Spain, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada as well as representatives from the United Nations, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It ran parallel to the International 
Conference devoted to discussing the situation in Afghanistan. 
 
The agenda of this conference focused on the security and, for the first time, Yemeni 
officials’ comments suggested the potential of Yemen reaching the stage of a failed state if it 
did not receive international support, referring to the rise of southern secession and the wars 
in Sa'ada. In his speech before the conference, Yemen’s Prime Minister confirmed his 
country’s commitment to continuing political and economic reforms and strengthening 
judiciary independence and the fight against corruption. He also stressed that terrorism would 
not deter Yemen from its commitment to the democratic path and political pluralism and that 
it would never be a safe haven for terrorists. 
 
Participants agreed that there was a complex political, economic and security crisis in 
Yemen. Political reform found its place in the output of the London Conference in the context 
of the security system and working to prevent Yemen from becoming a failed state. At the 
conference, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked the Yemeni government to carry 
out reforms and to continue the fight against corruption, pointing out the existence of an 
agreement with international help to secure the border of Yemen and promote unity in return 
for political and economic reform and pushing for the establishment of a democratic 
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Yemen's commitment to move forward in the implementation of the national agenda for 
comprehensive reforms was clear, as the Foreign Minister emphasized that "what these 
countries will do with Yemen, is help it implement its agenda of national reform and move 
forward with the fight against terrorism, more importantly, creating the atmosphere that helps 
find political solutions to Yemen's political situation through dialogue", and welcoming 




The final conference statement explicitly mentioned political reform as a commitment from 
Yemen and a commitment from the international community to support and build the 
capacity of Yemen in the implementation of the national agenda for comprehensive reforms. 
It also established two working groups, the first specializing in economy and governance and 
the second in justice and law enforcement.  
 
The London Conference also launched the Friends of Yemen Group in accordance with the 
Italian proposal; it held its first meeting in March 2010 to discuss the outputs of the 




Following this, a kind of rapprochement between the government and the opposition took 
place, through the joint record signature on 17 July 2010, a record which created a committee 
from each side to work on preparing the environment to resuming the national dialogue. This 
paved the way for a series of meetings by dialogue committees, but those were not meant to 
succeed, as will be explained below. 
 
After the London Conference, several meetings between Yemen and its friends were held in 
Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Berlin, followed by a Friends of Yemen conference in New York on 
24 September 2010. The New York meeting was decisive in dealing with a variety of issues. 
In this context, four key issues emerged for political reform, including: 
                                                          
29
 He said " I think the most important thing about Yemen commitments now is that they come out as a result also of a 
collaborative effort with donors and not only by Yemen alone. This commitment also stems from our belief that challenges 
we are facing now cannot be remedied unless we implement this agenda of reforms and the 10 points that Her Excellency 
alluded to, because this is now a priority (inaudible) that we have to start with, and I hope this is – will be one of the 
outcomes of this meeting". 
 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135930.htm. 
30
 See: The final statement text of the London Conference (2010), London, December 27 / January 2010. The official website of 
the official newspaper of al-Gomhoriah. www.algomhoriah.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic&sid=17717 
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A. The conference’s emphasis on the importance of urgently moving the dialogue 
forward to conduct serious discussions between the major political parties and other 
parties on sources of conflict and dispute. The national dialogue was viewed as the 
most effective way to move forward with urgently needed procedures to secure free 
and fair multiparty elections in 2011. 
B. Yemen urged to speed up with the investigation and prosecution of corruption 
perpetrators and to provide the first report of the extractive industries transparency 
initiative no later than February 2011. 
C. The expansion of the judicial system and supporting Yemen's commitment to 
establishing new courts in rural areas. 
D. Welcoming the government's commitment to continue implementing the 
recommendations of the international periodic review of the Human Rights 




As was evident from the London and New York conferences, there was a distribution of 
roles between the regional and international development partners. International partners 
focused on following up on political reform and security issues, while regional partners, 
represented by the GCC, focused on financial obligations and development issue. The 
next Friends of Yemen meeting was scheduled to be held in Riyadh in February 2011. 
 
 
The Fourth Chapter: Arab Spring in Yemen and the Collapse of Democracy – Building: 
Demands for Security and Support for Security 
 
The previous discussion gave us some evidence that the dialogue between the government 
and the opposition was on the verge of complete failure. The dispute between the parties was 
profound, the understanding of each side of the content of the February agreement was 
contradictory; the trust between the two sides was absent; the failure of the dialogue was 
expected. After a lapse of three months to form a joint committee, the depth of the gap 
between the two sides was apparent huge on many issues. It started to seem that no point to 
attract them, and push them to set together. The GPC went ahead in preparing and arranging 
for the parliamentary elections without the participation of the JMP. The election law was 
                                                          
31
 See:  The final statement text of the Conference of Friends of Yemen in New York (2010), New York, September 2010. The 
official website of the Yemeni news agency Saba. www.sabanews.net/ar/news224622.htm 
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presented in the House of Representatives, and was amended in December 2010 without the 
participation of JMP parliamentary members. The GPC started also to draft essential 
amendments in the constitution for endless period of the president. On the other hand, the 
JMP parties advanced its rejection to the procedures through escalated public action at 
polling stations, in electoral districts and the provinces, in the face of the unilateral actions 
and exclusionary policies adopted by the GPC. The steps from the two sides established a 
breakdown of the relationship between the authorities and the opposition and laid a 
foundation for the emerging political crisis that started in Dec. 2010, and escalated in the 
beginning of 2011 when the winds of Arab Spring blown Yemen.  
 
The fall of the Tunisian president, and the start of the 25 January  revolution which demanded 
the fall of the Egyptian president made President Saleh feel the magnitude of the errors. As a 
result, Saleh rushed to address the joint meeting of the House of Representatives and the 
Shura Council on 2 February, 2011, calling for freezing the constitutional amendments draft, 
and the marches of the opposition, asking them to come again for national dialogue. In 
general, his call for dialogue once again came relatively late, at a time when the Arab leaders 
in Tunisia and then Egypt began to fall rapidly.  
 
In the case of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the American policy in Yemen was met 
with confusion and was unable to adopt clear-cut trends. The preliminary remarks by the US 
ambassador in Sana’a gave an indication that Washington was committed to President 
Saleh’s regime on the basis of considerations of security cooperation, especially with regard 
to to al-Qaeda. The ambassador said that the cooperation with the president’s relatives was 
important, taking into consideration the positions that they hold in the security services that 
Washington has invested in, specifically the anti-terrorism teams in each of the Republican 
Guard and Special Forces, headed by the president's son, the Central Security units handled 
by the President’s nephew, the National Security Agency, which is controlled by the 
president brother’s second son, and the forces of private guards, led by the president brother’s 




From the American point of view, those people are the most qualified to deal with the U.S. 
strategy in its fight against al-Qaeda in Yemen, taking into consideration the U.S. training of 
                                                          
32
 http://www.alshibami.net/saqifa/showthread.php?t=82063. 
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these organizations, and the coordination and cooperation provided by the President’s 
relatives who lead these organizations. The statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates at the end of March 2011, reiterated the American ambassador’s statement when he 
said that a weak ruler after President Saleh would strengthen al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen 
33
. So it was clear that American thinking in the Yemeni events was still conditioned by the 
expected implications of Al-Qaeda file.  
 
However, the people’s insistence on bringing down President Saleh’s regime drove 
Washington to change part of its strategy. The US ambassador started getting involved. 
Washington put together an initial initiative that was discussed in a closed meeting at the 
Vice President’s home. The American ambassador and First Armored Division commander 
General Ali Mohsen who joined the revolution, and some of the leaders of the JMP attended 
that meeting. The debate was about vague arrangements to transfer power from the President 
to the Vice President. These efforts paved the way later for the development of the Gulf 
initiative's ideas on Yemen. In addition, the American ambassador played a role in 
persuading some of the tribes in the Yemeni Ma’reb province to release their hold on gas 
supplies in the area in the mid of April 2011, and in turn, the Yemeni government praised 




However, the relationship between the Yemeni government and the American ambassador 
did not last. After the American ambassador met a group of youth calling for change in the 
capital Sana’a, the government took offense and issued an announcement on 24 April 2011 
under the title "Ambassadors or guardians," which indicated that some ambassadors engaged 
in roles beyond the scope of their diplomacy and without permission from the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, and that they should do their part in strengthening the relations between states 
without offending them, or else it would be announced that they were not wanted 
35
. On the 
other hand the U.S. government supported the mediation efforts of the Gulf developed by the 
                                                          
33
 In an interview with ABC, in March 27, 2011, SEC. GATES said " Well, I think -- I think it is a real concern because the most 
active and, at this point, perhaps the most aggressive branch of al Qaeda -- al Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula operates 
out of Yemen. And we have had a lot of counterterrorism cooperation from President Saleh and Yemeni Security Services. 
So if that government collapses or is replaced by one that is dramatically more weak, then I think we'll face some additional 
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initiative with its principles and procedural aspects and saw it as an appropriate exit from the 
events experienced by Yemen.   
 
After work on the Gulf initiative was suspended, the U.S. ambassador tried to play an active 
role, especially after the president suffered a major injury as a result of an explosive device 
planted in al Nahdain Mosque on the premises of the presidential palace. The Ambassador 
conducted interviews with many sides including the vice president, General Ali Mohsen Al-
Ahmar and the leadership of the JMP, stressing that going back to the Gulf initiative and 
discussing it away from violence would be the best solution for a settlement. This was the 
same position which was confirmed by Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman during 
his visit to Sana'a on 22 June 2011 when he called for a peaceful, immediate and orderly 
transfer of power in accordance with the terms of the Gulf initiative, and called all the 





The European Union refrained from engaging with the developments, despite some of 
statements and declarations launched by the EU foreign policy coordinator Catherine Ashton 
in the early stages of the revolution in Yemen, when she pointed to the need of starting a 




The same thing applies to the United Nations, which sent the advisor to the Secretary 
General, Jamal Benomar, at the end of April and early May 2011 to collect data and conduct 
interviews with authority and opposition representatives, youth and academics, and settled for 
presenting the report to the Security Council without taking any effective measures in 
providing desired solutions. However, Benomar’s efforts entered a new phase in October 
2011 when he presented a report. According to this report, the Security Council issued 
Resolution No. 2014 on the 21st of the same month, which included the call for the Gulf 
initiative’s immediate signature without committing to the guarantees regarding human rights 
violations, and that implementation of the resolution provisions would be checked within a 
month. The action by Benomar in November 2011 to develop the Gulf initiative’s 
implementation mechanism and to persuade the Yemeni President to sign the Gulf initiative 
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on 23 November 2011 in the Saudi capital Riyadh 
38
, opened the doors to the presidential 
power transfer to his deputy and the issuance of a presidential decree calling for early one-
candidate presidential elections in February 2012, as well as the commissioning of an 
opposition candidate to form a national unity government to managing Yemen’s affairs in the 
next phase. 
 
Starting to implement the GCC initiative, many arrangements have been taken to hold the 
national dialogue. Representatives of many political parties, Houthis Movement, Southern 
Movement, youth, women, participated in the national dialogue for ten months, March 2013 
– January 2014). Many issues were discussed to build the New Yemen, but at the final stage 
the Houthis Movement rejected to sign the final document. In Sep. 2014 the Houthis 
Movement invaded the capital of the country, stepped down the government, and called for a 
new government. After hard efforts, a new government was formed, but no longer, the 
Houthis Movement blockaded the houses of the President, the Prime Ministers, and the 
ministers, and started to invade the southern governorates in the beginning of 2015, leading 
the country to the current crisis in Yemen. The president escaped to Saudi Arabia after calling 
them for help in 24
th
 of March, 2015. Saudi Arabia responded strongly to his call and 
launched the, Decisive Storm, a military air strike on the locations of the Houthis Movement 
all over the country. After six months of launching the war on Houthis, it seems that no 





1. The American influence was decisive in many of the main highlights of the political 
democratization process in Yemen, while the rest of the international roles were 
overshadowed by the U.S. role. The European role, for example, began to appear in 
the later stages, especially in the last stage of the presidential and local elections that 
took place in 2006 and the subsequent stages leading to the New York Conference in 
2010. The role of international organizations was shown on certain occasions by 
offering aid and loans required for the process of development and economic reform 
programs. 
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 See the text of the implementation mechanism of the Gulf initiative, the official website of the Yemeni Saba’ news 
agency,http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news203470.htm. 
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2. The influence exerted by the foreign variable on the political reform process in 
Yemen was linked to a large extent to the priorities connected to the security of great 
and major powers. In the early stages, democracy building, human rights and 
freedoms as part of the of western values system occupied the US priority in dealing 
with in the period prior to the bombing of the USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden 
in October 2000. However, things changed radically in the next phase, especially after 
the events of 11 September 2001. The growing role of al-Qaeda and its influence set 
the American and European working agendas, as security took priority over 
democracy, causing the democratization process to occupy a lower position compared 
with security. In the third phase, the democracy building became part of the security 
structure in Yemen's relations with both the United States and the European Union. In 
this stage, the Western evaluation of the general path of the democracy building 
became dependent on the extent of progress made by Yemen in the security arena in 
general, and dealing with terrorism and al-Qaeda in particular, to the extent that the 
political reform program lost its real content. Its collapse was the first real test faced 
by the Yemeni president at the outbreak of change in the Arab world. 
 
3. Foreign forces, whether represented by the United States or the European powers, 
were interested in political reform in Yemen through a focus on the issues of elections 
and their monitoring, without providing real support to the democratic process. 
 
4. Foreign support for the political reform experience  is linked to the nature of U.S. 
relations with Yemen’s neighboring countries in general, and Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf in particular. It was clear from many indicators that the development of the 
democratic experiment in Yemen should continue, yet without having repercussions 
on neighboring Gulf countries, particularly regarding the notions of political party 
pluralism and presidential elections. In other words, the Western powers are trying to 
balance their supporting of the democracy building experience in Yemen, and their 
maintaining an excellent relationship with the neighboring Gulf countries. 
 
5. The discussion of the regional context of the political reform experience in Yemen 
draws attention to a kind of Gulf noninvolvement in the issues of democracy building. 
Perhaps some democratic developments in some GCC countries, in part, can be 
explained by the impact of the political democratization experience in Yemen as well 
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as external variables and the development of some internal factors. This, in part, can 
be explained by the presence of a type of role distribution on an external level in 
Yemen, where the Western states handle the democratization part, and the GCC 
proceed with development and economic reform part. So it was not surprising that 
Gulf involvment in the political reform file came in the context of the GCC support 
for development projects in Yemen. The general course of this analysis remains valid 
even in context of the Gulf’s crucial role in diffusing the crisis in Yemen, and drawing 
some of the major foundations of the political reform process in Yemen, as contained 
in the Gulf Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism. 
 
6. Iranian interest in democracy building in Yemen is a special case. Iran does show 
support for Yemen in its unity and democratic experience, based on the existence of 
some common denominators such as the existence of parliamentary, local, and 
presidential elections, and the existence of an authority and an opposition. However, 
Iran’s particularity stems from its attempt to invest and employ the democratic 
experience in Yemen to serve its ideological objectives through the support provided 
to some Iranian-oriented sectarian organizations, support which has led in part to the 
development of the Houthi movement in Yemen and its transition from the process of 
spreading awareness and intellectual education to armed confrontation. This 
undermined stability and social peace in Yemen with the outbreak of six wars in the 
period between 2004 and 2010, and finally the armored expansion of the Houthis 
Movement to invade the capital of the country, to step down the president and the 
government, and to control the country in 2015. 
 
7. In conclusion, drawing the direction of political reform in Yemen according to the 
priorities of  the major powers’ interests  will not succeed. The changes in and 
collapse of the political reform in Yemen experience gives us conclusive evidence on 
the validity of this conclusion, a matter which regional and major powers with vital 
interests in Yemen  should be aware of. At the same time, the international 
community should support the political reform process in line with a number of major 
foundations: 
a. Political reform in Yemen will not be established in the presence of sustained 
influence by the conventional forces in the political system; by conventional 
forces we mean all political forces that were part of the Saleh regime, and engaged 
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in several rounds of failed dialogue. These forces will not produce a genuine base 
for the building process, which means that the international community 
specifically has to work together with the new and emerging elites, who believe in 
the democratization and in building a civil state in Yemen, and work to support 
the liberal forces that can be the decisive element in the future. 
 
b. Democracy building should be linked with the economic file, as the outcomes of 
democratization usually occur in the long term, while Yemen is replete with 
poverty in the comprehensive sense, and the priorities of its citizens are focused 
on securing a living. Therefore, democracy building in Yemen will not succeed if 
it is not linked to real solutions that combat poverty and improves living 
standards, raising wages and providing basic services such as education, 
electricity, and oil.  
 
c. The major powers should reconsider their security policies in Yemen. Eliminating 
al-Qaeda will not happen by force of arms and drones. The NATO experience and 
its failure in Afghanistan are lessons that should be benefited from in Yemen. The 
security policy is in need of economic and development policies and cultural 
approaches that target the factors creating a nurturing environment for al-Qaeda, 
violence, and terrorism in Yemen. Without this understanding, democratization 
based on security considerations will not succeed. 
 
 
d. Yemen support policies should envisage establishing real democratization process 
to build a civil state which respects human rights, promotes the role of institutions 
and relies on community-based mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power, 
and that is based on the principles of clear separation of powers that are free from 
association with certain authority figures and military leaders. 
